Publication Summary















A Report Prepared by the Corruption Prevention and Education Unit

Revised version September 1997

    This publication is available in other formats for the vision impaired upon request. Please advise of format needed, for example large print or as an ASCII file. This publication is available on the ICAC website in HTML format.

    © September 1997 - Copyright in this work is held by the Independent Commission Against Corruption. Division 3 of the Commonwealth Copyright Act 1968 recognises that limited further use of this material can occur for the purposes of `fair dealing', for example; study, research or criticism etc. However, if you wish to make use of this material other than as permitted by the Copyright Act 1968, please write to the Commission at GPO Box 500, Sydney NSW 2001.

    This report and further information about the Independent Commission Against Corruption can be found on the Commission's website at


Top Of PageNext Section

      Revised version September 1997 1




      Reform of the NYPD 5

      Reductions in crime 6

      Rooting out corruption 6

      Integrity related training 6

      External Agencies 7

      Precinct Based Investigations 7

      Concluding Comments 7


      Preventing Corruption in the NYPD 9

        1 Police Culture and Management 10

        2 Command Accountability 10

        3 Internal Investigations 10

        4 Sanctions and Deterrents 10

        5 Community Outreach 10

        6 Independent External Oversight 11


      Major Crime Rates Reduced 14


      Reform Of The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) 16

      Third International Internal Affairs Conference (June 1997) 18

      The Disciplinary System 19


      Borough Based Training 21

      Training For Promoted Officers 21

      Curriculum Development 22





      Police Reform 28

      Internal Affairs 28

      Police Training 28

      External Agencies 28

      The Nature of Corruption 28


      New York City Police Department 29

      Other Agencies 29

      NYPD Police Academy Training Sessions Observed 29


      NYPD Reform 30

      Internal Affairs Bureau 31

      Police Academy 31

      External Agencies 31

      Other readings 32


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    Commissioner Barry O'Keefe, QC, AM decided that as part of the Independent Commission Against Corruption's (ICAC) continuing commitment to corruption prevention and education work with the NSW Police Service, a visit to the New York Police Department (NYPD) should be undertaken. The aim was to study their corruption prevention and integrity training reforms following the Mollen Commission Report handed down on 7 July 1994.

    Vic Baueris, Principal Corruption Prevention Officer spent eight working days with NYPD officials from Wednesday 11 September to Friday 20 September 1996. Commissioner O'Keefe spent two days, Monday 16 and Tuesday 17 September, visiting the New York Police Academy.

    In 1997, the NYPD invited Vic Baueris to attend the third International Internal Affairs Conference, held at the Pace University, New York, on 19 and 20 June. The invitation was accepted because of the relevance of the Conference to the ICAC's corruption prevention and education work with the NSW Police Service, and the opportunity it provided to update the information collected in 1996.

    This report is a revised version of the first report released in December 1996. It was prepared by Vic Baueris.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    The New York Police Department (NYPD) has a staff of 38,000 police officers plus several thousand civilian staff to police the five boroughs of New York City. In 1994 the Transit Police and Housing Police Departments were amalgamated into the NYPD and became specialist squads alongside others such as the Detectives Bureau and the Narcotics Squad.

    The NYPD has an Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) of 600 officers.

    The NYPD Police Academy is responsible for recruit training, in-service training and retraining for officers promoted to supervisory positions.

    Since 1894 the NYPD has experienced a twenty year cycle of corruption scandals, commissions of inquiry, reform and then decline into new forms of corruption resulting in the establishment of new commissions of inquiry.

    The most recent commission, the Mollen Commission, reported in July 1994 that the most prevalent form of corruption was now police acting as criminals, especially in connection with the drug trade. The Mollen Commission made recommendations for change in six areas:

    _ police culture and management

    _ command accountability

    _ internal investigations

    _ sanctions and deterrents

    _ community outreach

    _ independent external oversight.

    The NYPD has undergone dramatic reform under the leadership of Mayor Guiliani and Police Commissioner Bratton, who was appointed in January 1994. The reform process has continued under current Commissioner Howard Safir who was appointed in April 1996.

Reform of the NYPD

    Commissioner Bratton approached reform as a manager, believing that modern business theory and practices could lift a low performing organisation to higher levels of accomplishment.

    He described his change process as going from 'a micro-managed organisation with very little strategic direction to a decentralised management style with strong strategic guidance at the top'.

    Key points of Bratton's approach were:

    _ seven crime control strategies and a strategy for dealing with police corruption were established and publicly released;

    _ precinct commanders were granted far greater latitude to initiate operations and run their own precincts;

    _ weekly crime statistics became the indicator of performance with computer pin mapping and other analytic techniques used to identify crime and corruption patterns;

    _ re-engineering teams were established to reform the organisational systems of the NYPD;

    _ a cultural diagnostic was conducted to determine the obstacles to change in the culture of the NYPD;

    _ a key accountability measure was the establishment of COMPSTAT (the abbreviation of computer statistics), meetings held twice per week to question precinct and squad commanders about their performance in crime prevention. These are meetings of more than a hundred of the most senior officials of the NYPD, and are used to positively reinforce good performance and to expose and correct poor performance.

Reductions in crime

    These strategies appear to have worked. The focus on an aggressive campaign against minor offenses-the 'broken windows' theory-has led to lower rates of major crime.

    From 1994 to 1995 there were reductions in the rate of every category of crime throughout New York City. In 1996 this trend has continued with the lowest recorded number of crime reports in 27 years.

    The critics of this approach point to the high degree of physical aggression used by predominantly white officers and the perceptions of racism in the targeting of areas of street crime.

Rooting out corruption

    NYPD Police Strategy Number 7 outlines the Department's anti-corruption strategies. The key task of transforming organisational culture is built around the value of respect, which is seen as the antidote to the culture of organisational fear, self protection, secrecy and exclusion which pervaded the NYPD.

    The anti-corruption strategy is based on three concepts as follows:

    _ an effective internal affairs function to serve as a deterrent to corruption, brutality and serious misconduct;

    _ re-engineering of the key organisational systems, especially in the areas of supervision, training and discipline;

    _ the construction of systems of external accountability and partnership to establish a bond of trust between the police and the public.

Integrity related training

    The introduction of effective integrity related training was regarded as an important strategy in dealing with the corruption identified by the Mollen Commission. A new commanding officer, who had received widespread publicity for leading a successful investigation of corrupt police officers, was appointed to the Police Academy as an important symbol of the new emphasis on training.

    Integrity subjects have been integrated into each of the three disciplines-the law, police science and social science-taught to recruits.

    The recruitment age has been lifted to 22 and a very strict drug testing policy introduced for all recruits.

    In 1995, more than 18,000 officers in the NYPD participated in a one-day ethics training course built around a series group exercises and discussions.

    Newly promoted officers are given training, emphasising integrity and anti-corruption, before they commence their new positions.

External Agencies

    Two external agencies have a significant role to play in the anti-corruption efforts of the NYPD.

    In February 1995, the Mayor established a Commission to Combat Police Corruption (CCPC). Its main duties are to:

    _ perform audits, studies and analysis to assess the quality of the NYPD's systems for combating corruption;

    _ receive complaints from the public and refer them to the NYPD or other agencies for investigation;

    _ oversee the work of the NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) in its investigation of complaints of corrupt conduct and serious misconduct.

    In 1993, an independent Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) was established. It has the power to investigate, make findings and recommend disciplinary action to the NYPD Commissioner on complaints involving excessive or unnecessary use of force, abuse of authority, discourtesy or offensive language.

Precinct Based Investigations

    Precinct based detectives in the NYPD investigate robberies, burglaries, larceny, domestic violence, less serious sexual crimes and some corporate crime matters.

    Traditionally, detectives in the NYPD have had a lesser involvement in corrupt conduct than uniformed officers. This contrasts with the situation in NSW. A senior chief of detectives suggested that this was a reflection of the greater maturity of detectives, the prestigious nature of their role and the extra responsibility they carry.

Concluding Comments

    The NYPD experience confirms that effective reform of a large police service is possible. A number of features stand out. They are:

    _ general reform of the organisation, based around the management principles of empowerment, resources, responsibility and accountability, is an important backdrop to effective corruption prevention;

    _ an effective internal affairs investigative arm, able to employ high quality investigators, is an important component;

    _ police training must be co-ordinated with the reform effort, and management training for middle managers is particularly important;

    _ external agencies with a clearly defined role have an important function in successful corruption prevention strategies.

    Finally, the history of corruption scandals in the NYPD suggests that the nature of police corruption will always change. Anti-corruption strategies must be based on this premise and mechanisms developed to analyse changes in the criminal milieu and society generally, and to draw conclusions about the consequent nature of police corruption.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    The NYPD is responsible for policing the five boroughs of New York City- Manhattan, The Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island. The population is close to 8 million and this figure is inflated each day by workers and tourists coming to the city.

    The NYPD employs 38,000 officers plus several thousand civilian staff. Each borough is divided into precincts (similar to a NSW Local Area Command) and the precincts are organised into eight patrol boroughs (Manhattan North and Manhattan South, Brooklyn North and Brooklyn South, Queens North and Queens South, The Bronx and Staten Island).

    The Department also has specialist squads such as the Detectives Bureau and the Narcotics Squad. In 1994 the Transit Police and Housing Police Departments were amalgamated into the NYPD. The NYPD has an Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) made up of 600 officers.

    The NYPD has a specialist police academy for training recruits, in-service training (borough-based training) and the training of officers moving to promotions positions. In September 1996, 1600 recruits were in training. The number of recruits in training has varied from a small intake of 400 up to the largest intake of 3000 students. The number of recruits enrolled is determined by the need to balance retirements and to maintain the numbers approved by the Mayor of New York City.

    The NYPD is responsible to the Mayor, who appoints the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners. Traditionally, the Commissioner has not been a sworn police officer. The most senior sworn police officer is Chief of the Department, Louis Anemone.

Preventing Corruption in the NYPD

    The NYPD has a long history of corruption scandals, commissions of inquiry, reform followed by decline into new forms of corruption and the establishment of a new commission of inquiry. Since 1970, two significant commissions of inquiry have been held.

    The Knapp Commission was established in May 1970 and found that:

    _ organised crime was the single biggest source of police corruption

    _ a second source of corruption was legitimate businesses seeking to ensure easy passage through the maze of City ordinances and regulations

    _ the most widespread form of misconduct was the acceptance of gratuities in the form of free meals or other goods and in a number of cases, this misconduct was the beginning of more serious forms of corruption.

    A new Internal Affairs Division was created in 1972 and, for the first time, the NYPD had one unit responsible for receiving and investigating corruption complaints.

    On 6 May 1992, NYPD Officer Michael Dowd and five others were arrested on drug charges. In June 1992, a newspaper article alleged that the NYPD had improperly handled earlier investigations into the corrupt practices of Officer Dowd.

    On July 24 1992, the then New York Mayor, David Dinkins, established an inquiry chaired by Milton Mollen to inquire into the Department's practices and methods for investigating allegations of corruption, and their practices and procedures designed to prevent corruption and maintain integrity.

    The Mollen Commission reported on 7 July 1994. It found (page 2):

    "While the systemic and institutionalised bribery schemes that plagued the Department a generation ago no longer exist, a new and often more invidious form of corruption has infected parts of this city, especially in high crime precincts with an active narcotics trade. Its most prevalent form is not police taking money to accommodate criminals by closing their eyes to illegal activities such as bookmaking, as was the case twenty years ago, but police acting as criminals, especially in connection with the drug trade. Corruption occurred not only because of fortuitous opportunities and the frailties of human nature, but often because of created opportunities and premeditated, organised group effort."

    The Mollen Commission made recommendations in six areas:

1 Police Culture and Management

    These recommendations covered the importance of a commitment to integrity; lifting the educational and character backgrounds of recruits; integrity training for all officers; improved personnel management; drug testing and gaining the support of police unions for NYPD anti-corruption strategies.

2 Command Accountability

    The Mollen Commission found that 'one of the most pervasive managerial failures the Commission has observed in the Department over recent years is its failure to maintain a system of command accountability'. The Mollen Commission made a series of recommendations for enforcing command accountability and improving supervisory practices in the Department.

3 Internal Investigations

    The Mollen Commission found that 'Internal Affairs had abandoned its mission to remove serious corruption from the Department'. The Mollen Commission made a series of recommendations to improve the internal respect for the Internal Affairs Bureau and to lift the quality of its investigators and its investigative approach.

4 Sanctions and Deterrents

    The Mollen Commission made a series of recommendations to increase the risk of detection of corrupt activities and strengthen the Department's efforts at applying sanctions.

5 Community Outreach

    The Mollen Commission endorsed the value of implementing community policing as a strategy for effective law enforcement. The Mollen Commission acknowledged however that 'community policing may increase opportunities for corruption' and made a series of recommendations to teach the public about police corruption, how to report it and how to support community members who make valid complaints of corruption.

6 Independent External Oversight

    The Mollen Commission concluded 'only the existence of an independent, external, effective corruption control monitor outside the Department's chain of command will serve as a continuing pressure upon the Department to purge itself of corruption'. The Mollen Commission argued that such independent oversight was the only means for breaking the historical cycle of scandal, reform and slide back into corruption.

    The Mollen Commission recommended the establishment of a permanent external Police Commission independent of the Department to assess and audit the Department's anti-corruption activities, assist in the implementation of anti-corruption programs, oversee a system of command accountability and conduct its own corruption investigations where necessary.

    By the time of the Mollen Commission's report in July 1994, a new Mayor, Rudolf W Giuliani, had been elected and a new Police Commissioner, William Bratton, had been appointed (in January 1994). Giuliani was a Republican and keen to establish himself as independent of the Democrat influences which had ruled City Hall for decades.

    Bratton had been a very successful Commissioner of the New York City Transit Police and was recruited from the Boston Police Department. Bratton appointed Jack Maple, who had been his special assistant at the Transit Police, as a deputy commissioner.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    Commissioner Bratton set out his reform program in a paper delivered to the National Institute of Justice Policing Research Institute on November 28 1995. The paper was titled Great Expectations: How higher expectations for Police Departments can lead to a decrease in crime.

    Bratton stated that his approach was that of a police manager, not a criminologist. He was not prepared to accept the prevailing image of police departments as 'slow moving and relatively ineffectual bureaucracies' which could not be reformed and were ineffectual in dealing with crime. His approach was to treat crime not as a sociological problem but as a management problem.

    He turned to modern business theory and practices which aim to make large organisations work more effectively towards their goals. In his view 'goals, it turns out, are an extremely important part of lifting a low performing organisation to higher levels of accomplishment and to revitalising an organisational culture'. He set about establishing ambitious goals for the NYPD as the first step towards achieving outstanding results. The key points of Bratton's approach were:

    _ the Department set a public goal of a 10 percent decrease in crime in 1994

    _ eight crime control strategies, dealing with guns, drugs, youth violence, domestic violence, reclaiming public spaces, car theft, police corruption and traffic control were developed and publicly released

    _ precinct commanders were granted far greater latitude to initiate operations and run their own precincts

    _ uniformed patrol police were encouraged to make drug arrests and to assertively enforce quality of life laws

    _ the central strategic direction of the Department became far stronger and the lines of accountability were made clearer

    _ weekly crime statistics became the indicator of how police were performing precinct by precinct and city-wide

    _ computer pin-mapping and other crime analysis techniques were used to identify crime and corruption patterns

    _ twelve re-engineering teams involving more than 300 people from every NYPD rank were established to redesign every major organisational system in the NYPD. More than 600 recommendations were made and over 80 percent were accepted and implemented

    _ a cultural diagnostic was conducted to determine the obstacles to change existing within the culture of the NYPD. This analysis found that long-standing, high-level concern about avoiding scandal and criticism had created a culture of organisational fear, self-protection, secrecy and exclusion. Bratton set about changing the culture to one of openness, inclusion and respect for and from the officers of the NYPD.

    Bratton described the change as going from 'a micro-managed organisation with very little strategic direction to a decentralised management style with strong strategic guidance at the top'.

    The NYPD adopted four operating principles for their attack on crime and their anti-corruption strategies. The four principles are:

    _ timely, accurate intelligence

    _ rapid deployment

    _ effective tactics

    _ relentless follow-up and assessment.

    In April 1996, a new Commissioner, Howard Safir, was appointed. He has continued the policies instituted by Bratton and introduced further reforms, including a strategy entitled Courtesy, Professionalism and Respect aimed at ensuring positive police/community relations and enhancing officer safety.


    A key accountability measure has been the establishment of COMPSTAT (the abbreviation of computerised statistics) meetings held twice a week on Wednesday and Friday mornings between 7 am and approximately 10 am.

    COMPSTAT meetings are described by Commissioner Safir, as follows:

    "These meetings are an integral facet of a comprehensive interactive management strategy which enhances accountability while providing local commanders with considerable discretion and the resources necessary to properly manage their commands. It also ensures that they remain apprised of crime and quality of life conditions within their areas of responsibility, and that the Department's eight crime and quality of life strategies are fully implemented throughout the agencies. The meetings also serve as a forum in which precinct and other operational unit commanders communicate the problems they face to the agency's top executives and share their successful crime reduction tactics with other commanders. The process allows top executives to carefully monitor issues and activities within precincts and operational units, to evaluate the skills and effectiveness of middle managers, and to properly allocate the resources necessary to reduce crime and improve police performance." (The COMPSTAT process, NYPD, p1)

    The ICAC was given the opportunity to observe one of these meetings. More than 100 officers attend in the Command and Control Centre of the NYPD. The centre is a huge room set up with highly sophisticated computer telecommunications equipment allowing for crime statistics and pin maps to be presented on several screens around the room, visible to all those in attendance.

    The meetings are generally chaired by Chief of Department Louis Anemone with at least one deputy commissioner in attendance. The precinct and other commanders from at least two police boroughs are in attendance to discuss their crime statistics and performance on a weekly and monthly basis. They present from a lectern in the centre of the room while relevant statistics are projected for all participants to witness. Chief Anemone controls the presentation of statistics, thereby controlling the matters to be discussed.

    The commanders are questioned in great detail about general trends or specific crimes occurring within their precincts. Representatives of other NYPD units are questioned where they have had some involvement or can offer expertise. Poor performance is dealt with openly and rigorously. On the other hand, positive work is congratulated and enforced for use in other precincts. Chief Anemone announces decisions about strategies and expects them to be taken forward from these meetings.

    In 1997, greater emphasis has been placed on dealing with citizen's complaints of assault, rudeness or harassment. Statistics on civilian complaints have been added to the COMPSTAT agenda and commandes are expected to have acted effectively and quickly. This reinforces the aims of the Courtesy, Professionalism and Respect strategy.

    While it did not occur in the presence of the ICAC, a number of those interviewed reported that a poor performance at COMPSTAT on a Friday can mean rapid transfer and possible disciplinary action on the following Monday. It is through this process that poor performers in the Department have been removed and strict accountability enforced. Similarly, good performance is publicly rewarded and successful strategies translated throughout the Department.

    In addition to crime statistics, the COMPSTAT Unit also develops commander profile reports. These reports provide information on the unit commander's appointment date and years in rank, the education and specialised training he or she has received, his or her most recent performance evaluation rating and the units he or she previously commanded. The profiles also capture statistics on the amount of overtime generated by members of the command, the number of NYPD vehicle accidents, absence rates due to sick time and line of duty injuries, and the number of civilian complaints lodged against members of the unit. In 1997, much greater emphasis has been given to civilian complaints and the action taken by commanders to deal with them effectively.

    Commander profiles for investigative units contain information about case loads and clearances, the number and ranks of the personnel assigned and their absence rates, and operational activities such as the number of perpetrator debriefings conducted and the number of search warrants executed. For precinct narcotic squad commander profiles, information on the number of confidential informants registered, the number of long-term buy operations conducted and the number of narcotics activity intelligence reports received, investigated and closed is also included. The aim of this data is to provide NYPD senior executives with the capacity to carefully monitor and assess how well commanders motivate and manage their personnel resources and how well they address important management concerns.

Major Crime Rates Reduced

    Bratton's strategies appeared to have worked. Over 1994 and 1995 there was a drop of 39.7 percent in murder, 30.7 percent in robbery, 36.1 percent in auto theft, 24.4 percent in burglary, 23.8 percent in grand larceny, 12.9 percent in serious assault and 7.7 percent in rape. Expressed in terms of human impact these percentages mean that in 1995 there were 373 fewer homicides, 11,949 fewer robberies, 19,988 fewer auto thefts, 12,520 fewer burglaries, 7,788 fewer major larcenies, 3103 fewer assaults, and 47 fewer rapes.

    According to the Mayor's Management report for the fiscal year of 1997, the trend is continuing. In the 1996 calendar year, the NYPD recorded the lowest number of crime reports for the seven major felonies (murder, robbery, rape first degree, felonious assault, burglary, larceny, grand larceny auto) in 27 years. For the first time since 1968, there were fewer than 1,000 reported murders (the total was 984). On the other hand, arrests for narcotics offenses rose 8.7percent, arrests for illegal peddling rose 13.8 percent and arrests for prostitution rose 112 percent.

    The effect on the citizens of New York has been quite dramatic.

    In the Weekend Australian of 5/6 October 1996, Cameron Stewart reported on 'The signs of a genuine renaissance' in Harlem. The article was about the rebirth of Harlem and the critical factor is argued to be the drop in the crime rate in the district. Stewart describes the outcome as the result of:

    "a unique policing strategy introduced by former New York Police Commissioner William Bratton.

    Bratton ordered a block by block computer study of crime in Harlem. Whenever crime appeared to be on the rise on a certain block, he would dispatch a special unit to the area until the crime rate subsided again.

    He also ordered a clampdown on trivial 'quality of life' offences such as jumping turnstiles at subways. These offenders were fingerprinted and often found to be responsible for larger unsolved crime."

    Stewart also comments that this campaign is being assisted by a decline in the crack market.

    Stewart concludes 'business is coming back, tourists are flooding in and Harlem may-finally-starting its long haul back to respectability'.

    In the New Yorker magazine of 3 June 1996, in an article titled 'The tipping point' Malcolm Gladwell described the rebirth of an area in the 75th precinct, a 5.6 square mile tract where some of the poorest people in the city live. Gladwell records that in 1993 there were 176 homicides in the 75th precinct, in 1995 there were 44. Gladwell describes the policies introduced by Bratton and relates the rebirth of these districts to the their effectiveness. Gladwell then postulates that a new way of thinking about crime is needed. He discusses the idea that social problems behave like infectious agents and that there is a 'tipping point' at which a series of small changes can have huge effects.

    Perhaps Bratton's attention to 'trivial problem'-the broken window theory- reached the point at which his series of apparently modest changes has brought about enormous effects.

    On 9 August 1997, an incident occurred in the 70th Precinct station in Brooklyn which has raised serious questions about some aspects of the NYPD's approach. A Haitian resident has alleged that he was beaten and sodomised by several white police officers. Two officers face charges and others are expected. All charges against the Haitian man were dropped and he is seeking damages from the City. Citizens are questioning the degree of racism still exhibited by the NYPD and the racial bias in their approach to policing. (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 August 1997, p42.)


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    Police Strategy Number 7 established the following goal:

    "As it moves assertively to reduce crime, disorder, and fear in the city it serves, the New York Police Department will empower, instruct, galvanise, and hold accountable management, supervision, and personnel at all levels to create a police agency of unparalleled integrity that is thoroughly and effectively intolerant of corruption and brutality throughout its ranks."(p3)

    Achievement of this goal was to be based on a new policy of inclusion, which is aimed at making all commanders the trusted colleagues of the Internal Affairs Bureau, supervisors becoming skilled and effective front line managers and all officers becoming allies in the drive against corruption and brutality.

    The cultural diagnostic conducted in 1994 found that long standing, high level concern about avoiding scandal and criticism had created within the NYPD a culture of organisational fear, self protection, secrecy and exclusion. Generally the organisational culture was regarded as negative, with officers at precinct level most likely to feel that they were not trusted or respected by the organisation.

    The NYPD decided that the transformation of their organisational culture would be built around the value of respect. Police Strategy Number 7 describes respect in the following terms:

    "Respect is the antidote to the arrogance that arises when fear of scandal replaces performance accountability, when self protection replaces organisational risk taking, when secrecy and exclusion replace shared responsibility for delivering on a common goal. An organisation where systems are constructed to engender respect in, for, and from its members will spawn thousands of men and women who police with confidence, skill and self esteem."(p5)

    The NYPD determined that three things were needed to achieve a culture of committed action grounded in integrity and respect. The three things are:

    _ an effective internal affairs function to serve as a deterrent to corruption, brutality and serious misconduct;

    _ re-engineering of the key organisational systems, especially in the areas of supervision, training and discipline;

    _ the construction of systems of external accountability and partnership to establish a bond of trust between the police and the public.

Reform Of The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)

    The NYPD's internal affairs investigative capacity, despite reforms following the Knapp Commission, was regarded as totally ineffective by the end of the 1980s. The problems were:

    _ shared responsibility between the old Internal Affairs Division and Field Internal Affairs Units established in each of the Patrol boroughs, created confusion and meant that there were no clear lines of accountability;

    _ the Internal Affairs Division was dealing with only about 5 percent of cases and yet the Field units had virtually none of the investigative resources;

    _ the Internal Affairs Division made no effort to ensure the quality of field investigations;

    _ the investigative techniques employed by the Internal Affairs Division were grossly inadequate;

    _ the Internal Affairs Division operated in a very secretive manner, precinct commanders and others were excluded from any knowledge of internal investigations. Integrity control officers-lieutenants who are responsible for integrity in each precinct-were also excluded from any information;

    _ the Internal Affairs Division suffered from inadequate personnel, training and equipment. The Division had great difficulty in attracting talented and experienced investigators;

    _ the Internal Affairs Division was regarded as being obsessed with so-called, 'white socks' breaches, rather that serious corruption.

    In 1993, the old Internal Affairs Division and its Field Internal Affairs units were abolished and a new Internal Affairs Bureau established. The IAB conducts all investigations into allegations of police corruption and serious misconduct. Inspection units have been established and assigned to each of the borough commands and other major bureaus. They handle all cases of minor misconduct.

    Experienced investigators of high standing in the NYPD have been appointed to the IAB. The NYPD uses a system of examinations to promote officers to investigator ranks. The IAB has been given first choice of all newly qualified investigators and chooses the best of them. They are expected to stay at IAB for a minimum two year period and then transfer to other investigative assignments, usually those of their choice.

    The IAB is staffed by 600 investigators and other staff. The investigation teams are divided into geographic groups covering the five boroughs of New York City. Specialist units have been established to conduct surveillance, to conduct integrity testing, to examine all allegations of excessive force by police officers and to investigate criminal impersonations of police officers.

    A Corruption Prevention and Analysis unit has been established headed by an experienced detective. Its role is to prepare detailed statistics on corruption complaints by various categories for report to NYPD senior command and precinct commanders. The policy of inclusion demands that detailed information be available, not only on specific cases or individuals, but also on trends in precincts and across the Department.

    Command profiles are prepared by the CP and Analysis Unit for discussion between the commanders of IAB and precinct commanders. While this process is not conducted in an open forum like COMPSTAT meetings, its intention is the same in relation to accountability for corruption prevention performance by each commander.

    The IAB has been provided with the most advanced technology for surveillance and other investigative work. The four operating principles previously described have been adopted by the IAB to ensure highly effective investigation and follow up.

    The IAB has its own training unit and conducts an intensive ten day training session for all investigators. IAB trainers have also been used by the Police Academy in recruit and promotion training.

    The IAB offers a 24 hour, 7 day a week coverage of the NYPD. Calls are received by the IAB Command Center which categorises each matter and conducts a preliminary investigation. In 1996 it received almost 17,000 calls, 10 percent of which became IAB cases. Information can also be provided directly via the Internet.

    A fully staffed investigative unit is assigned each night to provide immediate response to a crime scene and to aid in assessing corruption allegations.

    Part of the proactive work of the IAB is integrity testing. The IAB conducts two types of integrity tests:

    _ targeted testing in which an identified officer is the subject of a particular allegation

    _ random testing which is not directed at a particular individual but addresses a corruption trend identified by the CP and Analysis Unit or by other means.

    In 1995, 1,222 officers were tested during 565 different test. Eleven members of the service failed integrity tests and their services were terminated. In 1996, 707 tests were conducted involving 1,320 officers. The number of failures was 24. (See Chapter 5 for a report on the effectiveness of integrity testing.)

    The NYPD has a policy of zero tolerance of any drug use by its officers and employees. In 1995, forensic hair testing was performed in addition to urine analysis when a drug test for 'cause' is approved and administered. Random urine testing is also conducted and all recruits to the Academy are tested.

    The number of corruption cases has declined, following the trend in reported crimes in New York City. In 1996, there were 1,726 corruption cases recorded, a decrease of 10.2 percent from 1995.

    In the August 1997 incident at Precinct 70 previously referred to, there has been criticism of the slow response by IAB to the report of the incident. (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 August 1997, p42.)

Third International Internal Affairs Conference (June 1997)

    The conference provided an opportunity for officers of police services and other anti-corruption agencies from around the world to learn from the experience of the NYPD. In addition to a number of speakers, workshops were held on four topics as follows:

    _ proactive strategies (integrity testing)

    _ intelligence gathering

    _ police impersonation and solicitation

    _ technical equipment.

    Of particular interest was the detailed information provided about the integrity testing program. The four objectives of the integrity testing program are to:

    1. create additional anti-corruption tools in an effort to identify and catch corrupt officers

    2. create a measure of corruption which will assist in the analysis of corruption within the NYPD

    3. establish a sense of omnipresence within the NYPD with the goal of having members of the service handle each assignment as if it were an integrity test

    4. identify training needs and communicate these needs for appropriate follow up.

    A review of the testing program by the Commission to Combat Police Corruption and consideration of its effectiveness by the NYPD, has led to a decision to increase by 40 percent the number of targeted tests to be conducted in 1997, and to reduce the random testing program by 30 percent. The random program was not meeting all of the objectives established for integrity testing. In the last two years only two failures had occurred.

The Disciplinary System

    One aspect of the re-engineering process was an evaluation of the effectiveness of the NYPD's disciplinary system. The outcome was a system that was less centralised, in that additional disciplinary authority was given to commanding officers, time frames were established for processing charges and a clearer definition of the role of NYPD prosecutors was developed.

    A Disciplinary Assessment Unit was established to oversee the new discipline system. Precinct commanders can now determine penalties of up to ten days deduction from leave and this has resulted in a 30 percent reduction in cases dealt with at headquarters. Precinct commanders must conclude their investigations and determine penalty within 60 days-NYPD surveys showed that most officers thought 30 days to be a more reasonable time period.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    The New York Police Academy is located in its own premises in central Manhattan. Staff at the academy are responsible for training recruits, officers receiving promotion and the borough based training program. In recent years, the academy inherited additional facilities in Brooklyn with the amalgamation of the New York Transit Police into the NYPD. Training for officers receiving promotion is conducted at the Brooklyn facility.

    Following the Mollen Commission report, a renewed focus was given to training, particularly integrity-related training. As a signal of the importance attached to training, a new commanding officer, Inspector Tom Belfiore, was appointed. Before this appointment, Belfiore lead a very successful investigation of corrupt activity by officers which resulted in the arrest of 35 police officers and more than 30 successful prosecutions.

    A new training director, Dr James O'Keefe was also appointed. O'Keefe has strong academic credentials combined with experience in both the Houston and New York Police Departments.

    Recruit training is divided into three academic disciplines-the law, police science and social science. Integrity subjects have been integrated into each of the disciplines. These sessions are now taught by academy staff, rather than being the sole province of lecturers from the Internal Affairs Bureau. The strategy has been to make integrity related courses an integral part of normal academy teaching, rather than be seen as a unique subject which is only the province of police staff connected with IAB.

    In the police science course the following topics are covered:

    _ NYPD mission and values

    _ procedures governing sick leave and accidents on duty

    _ prohibited conduct

    _ disciplinary procedures

    _ professionalism and ethics

    _ collecting and preserving evidence at crime scenes

    _ proper administration of property and evidence

    _ proper treatment of prisoners

    integrity workshop using scenarios from the Mollen Commission and other corrupt incidents.

    In the social science course the following topics are covered:

    _ proper use of police discretion

    _ accountability

    _ police cynicism

    _ institutions and secrecy

    _ the ethical use of police authority

    _ NYPD code of ethics

    _ improper off-duty behaviour

    _ police brutality

    _ bribery, unlawful gratuities and similar occurrences.

    In total, approximately 70 hours of course time is spent on integrity related issues.

    Observation of two recruit integrity training sessions highlighted the importance of the trainers being committed and enthusiastic. Involvement of recruits in discussions about ethics and understanding the high demands placed on police officers was more effective than a lesson where a long lecture with substantial detail about the history of corruption in the NYPD was presented.

Borough Based Training

    All NYPD officers undergo five days of training in each year. These generally involve two days of training in tactics, two days at the firing range and a fifth day which is usually another practical session on matters such as self defence without use of guns.

    In the 1995 cycle, a one day course on police professionalism and ethics was presented to more than 18,000 officers in the NYPD. The course was a direct result on the Mollen Commission recommendations, but at this time there are no plans to repeat the course.

    The course was built around a series of group exercises and discussions aimed at taking participants through an understanding of values and the fact that there can be competing values in situations, the scale of rationalisations which can be applied to corrupt conduct, the opportunity to confront moral dilemma which officers may experience on the job and the development of a three-step procedure for resolving such dilemmas.

    Instructors were given training and detailed notes for the presentation of these sessions. The commitment of instructors to the concepts behind the course was critical to its success.

Training For Promoted Officers

    In the NYPD, promotion to the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant and captain are based on the successful completion of promotion exams and study at college level. For appointment to sergeant, officers must have five years experience and a two year college degree; for appointment to lieutenant, officers must have three years experience as a sergeant and a three year college degree; for appointment to captain, a four year college degree is required.

    In recent years, the NYPD has introduced compulsory training courses for all successful applicants for promotion, before appointment to positions at the new level.

    Relevant components of these courses cover the leadership skills required in promotions positions, scenario and role play training on issues with an integrity component and presentations from senior officers of the IAB.

    Observations of sessions in each of these three categories suggested that the course materials still require development and a high level of commitment and adult training skills are required.

    Newly promoted sergeants were observed and brought with them the street level cynicism developed from their years on active duty. Turning that cynicism to a positive outlook about the integrity components of their new leadership role requires great skill.

    The use of video tapes from integrity tests was effective in exposing the reality of corrupt conduct.

Curriculum Development

    The NYPD Academy does not employ trainers who are not police officers. The Director of Training acknowledged that this limits the range of views introduced to students and perpetuates a fairly insular approach. This difficulty was confirmed in discussions with John Kleinig, head of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York. Kleinig has recently published a book titled The ethics of policing (Cambridge University Press, 1996). He described the academy as being very secretive and not involving outsiders in their work. A number of serving NYPD officers are post graduate students with John Kleinig.

    We discussed the difficulty of teaching ethical behaviour. His approach is to talk about the profession of policing, the importance of pride in police work and the special responsibilities held by officers. He seeks to make the connection between the tools available to police officers and the connection between ethics and competence.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    The Mollen Commission recommended the creation of a permanent external Police Commission, independent of the NYPD, to:

    _ perform continuous assessments and audits of the Department's systems for preventing, detecting and investigating corruption

    _ assist the Department in implementing programs and policies to eliminate the values and attitudes that nurture corruption

    _ ensure a successful system of command accountability

    _ conduct, when necessary, its own corruption investigations.

    Mayor Giuliani followed this recommendation to the extent that he established a Commission to Combat Police Corruption, with its function being to assess the effectiveness of the Police Department's implementation and maintenance of anti-corruption efforts. The Mayor decided that the responsibility for the investigation of allegations of corrupt or criminal conduct by police should remain with the NYPD.

    On 27 February 1995, the Mayor issued an executive order to establish the new Commission. Its duties are to:

    _ perform audits, studies and analysis to assess the quality of the Police Departments systems for combating corruption. This includes oversight of the Department's anti-corruption policies and procedures, their methods for gathering intelligence on corrupt activities and investigating allegations, the effectiveness of the system of command accountability, supervision and training, and the effectiveness of the Department's procedures for involving all officers in the fight against corruption

    _ carry out studies of the conditions and attitudes within the Department that tolerate, nurture or perpetuate corruption. The Commission shall liaise with community groups in this regard

    _ receive complaints from the public and refer them to the Police Department or other agency for investigation.

    The Mayor's executive order requires the full cooperation of all members of the Police Department with the Commission in the performance of its audits, studies or analysis. Obstruction of the Commission's functions shall be reason for removal from office or employment or other appropriate penalty. The NYPD is required to provide any documents, records or reports required by the Commission.

    The Mayor can give approval, in exceptional circumstances, for the Commission, with the assistance of the New York City Department of Investigations (an agency similar to the ICAC with responsibility for investigating corruption allegations against the 400,000 employees of New York City), to investigate an allegation of corrupt conduct.

    The Commission is required to provide the Mayor with an annual report containing an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Police Department's anti-corruption measures.

    The Commission is made up of five members, all of whom serve part-time and unpaid. The Commission meets once per week. It has a small staff of five including an executive director, two lawyers, one analyst and one support staff.

    The first report of the Commission was released in March 1996. It describes a number of projects being undertaken by the Commission. They include:

    _ a review of a sample of closed IAB cases examining the efficiency of the work, the level of aggression in the investigation and the quality of the outcome

    _ an examination of the work of integrity control officers to look at their workload, the type of work they undertake and their effectiveness

    _ an examination of the IAB classification of complaints to determine their appropriateness.

    The Commission examines the daily log of complaints to the IAB and they can request further information on reason for IAB decisions and the course of investigations being conducted. One area of interest referred to in the annual report is the need for the NYPD to go further in making command accountability a 'fully functioning reality'. The Commission is considering the need for a unit which would examine the outcomes of corruption investigations to identify the responsible commanders and their performance in dealing with the corrupt conduct.

    The Commission is looking at the integrity training program of the academy and is developing recommendations for improvements to the integrity training packages for recruits, those officers receiving promotions and general borough based training.

    In December 1996, the Commission released three studies containing recommendations for improvements to different aspects of the NYPD's integrity systems. The reports covered:

    _ Integrity testing program

    The study found that random integrity testing was not meeting all of its objectives and that there should be a decrease in this aspect of the program and an increase in the targeted integrity testing program which was regarded as more effective.

    _ Integrity Control Officers (ICO)

    The NYPD appoints ICOs to each precinct to detect potential integrity problems, and to support precinct commanders and the IAB in their anti-corruption efforts. The CCPC recommended that the amount of administrative work done by ICOs needed to be reduced; that they should be required to spend more time in the field, including patrol work and developing community contacts; and that ICOs should participate in developing targeted integrity tests.

    _ Discipline of officers who make false statements

    The Commission concluded that the penalties imposed on officers for lying were insufficient. It recommended that except in exceptional circumstances, false statements, including false statements to cover up the misconduct of others, should result in dismissal from the NYPD. The Police Commissioner agreed and announced that any officer found to have made a false statement in criminal, civil or internal disciplinary proceedings will be dismissed.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    Since 1953, there has been a review process for civilian complaints against NYPD officers. Until 1993, the review process was located within the NYPD. In 1993, an independent review board made up of thirteen members was established, and the work of this board became totally independent of the NYPD. The Mayor appoints five members, the City Council five and the NYPD Police Commissioner nominates three.

    The Board has the power to investigate, make findings and recommend action to the NYPD Commissioner on complaints involving:

    _ excessive or unnecessary use of force

    _ abuse of authority

    _ discourtesy

    _ offensive language (including, but not limited to, slurs relating to sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religion, gender or disability).

    The CCRB works closely with IAB to avoid duplication. Often the IAB has interviewed officers before the CCRB becoming involved and then IAB statements are made available to the CCRB.

    The CCRB employs 75 investigators divided into eight squads. They are all civilians, many of them young staff employed straight out of college. They were described as intelligent individuals with good communication skills. A senior prosecutor employed on the CCRB staff has developed a training program in investigative techniques for new staff. They also attend a two-day seminar on police procedures at the Police Academy.

    The CCRB receives approximately 10,000 complaints per year of which about 60 percent actually fall within their jurisdiction. Up to 40 percent of this number do not turn up for the interview and if after two further contacts, no interview can be organised, the file is closed.

    In 1996, the number of complaints fell by 11.9 percent over 1994. 1995 had shown a small increase of 1.5 percent over 1994.

    Investigating officers write a report on each complaint, which is then submitted to a three person sub-committee of the CCRB which determines whether misconduct has occurred and reports to the Police Commissioner. The CCRB has limited resources for its work and does not have the capacity to do proactive work or develop corruption prevention measures for recommendation to the NYPD.

    The CCRB has instituted an extensive community education campaign. Public Affairs staff address community organisations on the CCRB's work and multi-lingual brochures are distributed. Radio and television are also used to publicise the CCRB's complaint hotline.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

    Lieutenant George Pagan is the commanding officer of the Midtown North Detective Squad. The Midtown North Precinct covers the central business district of Manhattan just south of Central Park. It includes the diamond trading district, most of the major hotels in New York and the west side around 8th Avenue where drugs and prostitution thrive.

    Pagan has had twenty-six years as a detective in the NYPD, including ten months at the IAB.

    The more serious narcotics investigations, major prostitution and gambling matters are dealt with by specialised squads.

    Uniform police in the precinct undertake minor investigations and all community policing matters.

    Precinct detectives investigate all robberies, burglaries, larceny, domestic violence, the less serious sexual crimes, some corporate crime matters and matters arising in the diamond district.

    Pagan gives credit to the policies introduced by Commissioner Bratton for reducing the level of crime in his precinct. The Midtown North precinct had 30 to 40 homicides per year in the past. In 1994 there were only 8 homicides, 8 in 1995 and at the time of interview in September 1996, no homicides had occurred.

    He gave two reasons for this reduction. The first and most important was the aggressive campaign instituted by the NYPD to get weapons off the streets. He said that the judicial system had become more supportive in recent years of arrests for carrying guns.

    He also cited improvements in emergency medical services in reducing the number of deaths from shootings.

    He strongly commended Bratton's general reform process of placing more responsibility of precinct commanders and other supervisors for dealing with crime. The morning of my interview with him, he had attended COMPSTAT to report on the performance of his precinct. He believed that the increased accountability arising from COMPSTAT had been very successful.

    He cited the typical police service problems of insufficient staff, some low morale due to poor pay and fairly run down conditions in the precinct office.

    His team leaders go through all the crime reports received by the precinct. This is to ensure that uniform officers have referred all relevant matters to the detectives and any developing patterns of crime can be ascertained by the detectives.

    The criteria for screening cases are semi-formal. Solvability is the main factor. All decisions as to whether a case will be investigated or not are reviewed by a lieutenant in the uniformed section, the detectives and in some cases the precinct commanders.

    For every file opened by the detectives, the commanding officer expects to receive a written report recommending further action within three days. This is a NYPD requirement.

    The commander then determines when the next report is required and this is usually within seven days.

    Within twenty-one days of a crime occurring, the commander has to determine whether or not the case will stay open. Most cases are closed within seven days.

    Each case in the detectives office is entered onto their local stand-alone computerised case management system. A hand written case management sheet is also held by the supervisors on each case referred to detectives.

    The case management system gives the commander information about what stage the case has reach and whether the necessary paper work has been completed.

    Only the sergeants have the authority to close a case on the computer and the commander checks all such decisions.

    Detectives enter information onto the case management system, but cannot change or delete material once it has been entered. Pagan believes that it is an effective corruption prevention tool and the management reports which can be provided are of great use to him.

    The NYPD crime report database is on-line throughout the Department but the case management system is stand alone.

    So far this year, 16,000 crime reports have been received at the Midtown North precinct. Three thousand cases have been opened in the detectives office. Currently the office has thirty detectives although their entitlement is forty-one.

    Files are stored at the precinct, however Pagan admitted that on occasions detectives will personally keep some important documents to ensure there safe keeping.

    Detectives keep a minute book in which they record all events during their working session. Either Pagan or a sergeant checks and signs the book each week.

    Pagan believes that since the Mollen Commission there has been more tolerance of the work of the IAB. Police generally do not like the integrity tests or investigations for petty matters.

    In his view, the history of corruption in the NYPD involving more uniformed police than plain clothes detectives is a reflection of the greater maturity of detectives, the prestigious nature of their role and the extra responsibility they carry.

    He talks to all new appointments to the precinct about corruption and the importance of acting against it.

    He supports the idea that all detectives should work at the IAB for at least one year. He believes this would be particularly beneficial for sergeants, lieutenants and captains. This would reduce the stigma of working at IAB and show officers in supervisory positions the reality of corrupt officers and the nature of the conduct in which they may indulge.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

Police Reform

    The NYPD experience confirms that effective reform of a large police service is possible. The reform process was built around four management principles as follows:

    _ empowerment

    _ resources

    _ responsibility

    _ accountability.

    Leadership from both the political and administrative arms was critical to the NYPD reform program.

    Cultural change is a slow process and requires constant vigilance to change behaviour at all levels of a police service.

Internal Affairs

    An effective and efficient Internal Affairs investigative arm, with proactive strategies built around good intelligence, is a key element of an effective anti-corruption strategy. Steps need to be taken to ensure the employment of high quality staff in the Internal Affairs section and overcoming the strongly felt antipathy towards officers who work in Internal Affairs is an important strategy.

Police Training

    The training effort must be co-ordinated with the reform effort. A critical component is leadership training for middle managers.

External Agencies

    External oversight, with clearly defined roles for the relevant agencies, is an important factor in successful corruption prevention. A cooperative relationship between external agencies and the Police Service is important. The balance between cooperation and independence must be maintained.

The Nature of Corruption

    The nature of police corruption will change as society changes and the criminal milieu adapts. Anti-corruption strategies which ignore this phenomenon will fail.


Previous SectionTop Of PageNext Section

New York City Police Department

    Becker, John Junior (Lieutenant), Head of the Intelligence Unit, IAB

    Belfiore, Tom (Inspector), Commanding Officer, NYPD Police Academy

    Brennan, Patrick (Chief ), Chief of Criminal Investigations, IAB

    Grasso, George (Deputy Inspector), Commanding Officer, Disciplinary Assessment Unit

    Henry, Vincent (Sergeant), Office of Management Analysis and Planning, Police Commissioner's Office

    Kelleher (Chief), Head of the Detective Bureau (1996), Deputy Commissioner (1997)

    Michel, William A (Captain), Training Unit, IAB

    O'Keefe, James (Dr), Director of Training, NYPD Police Academy

    O'Mahoney, John, (Lieutenant), Supervisor of the Central Command Center, IAB

    Pagan, George (Lieutenant ), Commanding Officer, Midtown North Detective Squad

    Pizzuti, Dianna (Inspector), Head of the Corruption Prevention and Analysis Unit, IAB

    Powers, Ray (Inspector), IAB

    Tighe, Mike, Head of the Uniform In-service Training Unit, NYPD Police Academy

Other Agencies

    Ford, Kevin, Deputy Commissioner of Investigations, New York City Department of Investigation

    Gubbay, Joseph, Executive Director, Commission to Combat Police Corruption

    Jay, John, College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York

    Kleinig, John, Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Institute for Criminal Justice and Ethics

    Lopez, Gene, Executive Director, Civilian Complaint Review Board

NYPD Police Academy Training Sessions Observed

    IAB Training Courses -Field Surveillance Techniques, Sergeant John Egan

    Search and Seizure, Sergeant Kevin McCallister, NYPD Legal Bureau

    Conduct of Pre-trial Interviews, Lieutenant Ray Daniels, IAB

    Sergeant Training Course, IA Operations, Inspector Ray Powers

    Leadership Training Course

    Integrity Role Plays

    Recruit Integrity Training, two sessions, one given by Sergeant Direnzo, the second by Officer Diprenda


Previous SectionTop Of Page

NYPD Reform

    Police strategy number 1: Getting guns off the streets of New York.

    Police strategy number 2: Kerbing youth violence in the schools and on the streets.

    Police strategy number 3: Driving drug dealers out of New York.

    Police strategy number 4: Breaking the cycle of domestic violence.

    Police strategy number 5: Reclaiming the public spaces of New York.

    Police strategy number 6: Reducing auto related crime in New York.

    Police strategy number 7: Rooting out corruption; building organisational integrity in the New York Police Department.

    Police strategy number 9: Courtesy, Professionalism, Respect.

    NYPD Strategy '97: Goal-Oriented Neighbourhood Policing

    Bratton, William J, November 28, 1995, Great expectations: how higher expectations for police departments can lead to a decrease in crime, National Institute of Justice Policing Research Institute.

    Safir, Howard, The COMPSTAT Process, NYPD

    Guiliani, Rudolf, Mayor of New York, Mayor's Management Reports, Fiscal 1996 and 1997.

    Henry, Vincent, Lifting the blue curtain: some controversial strategies to control police corruption.

    Henry, Vincent, Patterns of police corruption and reform: comparing New York City and Queensland.

    Henry, Vincent, 1994, Police corruption: tradition and evolution, in Unpeeling tradition: contemporary policing, edited by Bryett and Lewis, Macmillan Education Australia, Melbourne.

    Henry, Vincent, 1991, The prospects of police reform in Queensland: an analysis of necessary conditions and strategies, The Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, Brisbane.

    Gentile, John R, 1997, "Free Donuts & More", A commentary on police misconduct and corruption.

    Spring 30100, Volume 58, Special edition 1995, (NYPD Magazine) Anemone, Lewis, Chief of Department, NYPD, Problem solving strategies for community policing-a practical guide.

    Gladwell, Malcolm, The tipping point, New Yorker Magazine, 3 June 1996.

    Stewart, Cameron, Harlem, Land of Opportunity, The Weekend Australian, 5-6 October 1996.

    Massing, Michael, Crime and drugs: the new myths, The New York Review, 1 February 1996.

Internal Affairs Bureau

    Annual Reports, 1995 and 1996.

    Training Unit Library catalogue.

    Investigation training workshop, 2nd IAB Conference, June 1996.

    Basic methods of internal investigation training course papers.

    Disciplinary assessment unit, 1st Annual Report June 1996.

    Third International Internal Affairs Conference papers:

    Proactive Strategies

    Intelligence gathering

    Police Impersonation.

Police Academy

    Police Academy Information brochure.

    List of Police Academy Integrity related training courses.

    Lesson outlines for integrity courses in Police Science, and Law.

    Instructors guide for borough based training program in police professionalism and ethics.

    In-tac training cycle 1996, course outlines.

    Scenarios for desk officer workshop.

    Leadership course curriculum papers.

External Agencies

    Executive order number 18, 27 February 1995, Establishment of commission to combat police corruption.

    First report of the Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 25 March 1996.

    Status report of the Civilian Complaint Review Board, December 1995.

    Commission to Combat Police Corruption reports:

    The NYPD Random Integrity testing Program (Dec 1996)

    The NYPD Disciplinary System: How the Department Disciplines its Members who make False Statements (Dec 1996)

    The Role and Utilization of the Integrity Control Officer (Dec 1996).

Other readings

    Kleining, John, 1996, The Ethics of policing, Cambridge University Press, USA

    Program of the Mid Atlantic Police Supervisory Institute, Christopher Newport University, Virginia, USA

    Bibliography on teaching criminal justice ethics, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, January 1996.

    Series of case studies for teaching of police ethics at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

Top Of PagePublication Summary